

Public Opinion Survey in Five Provinces on Levels & Consequences of Corruption in Papua New Guinea & State & Society Response





TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL PNG INC.

A national chapter of Transparency International

– the coalition against corruption

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Public Opinion Survey in Five Provinces on Levels and Consequences of Corruption in Papua New Guinea and State and Society Response, 2015

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Abbreviations	
ALAC	Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre
CFP	Calls for Proposals
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index (Global)
CPS	Corruption Perceptions Survey (PNG only)
EHP	Eastern Highlands Province
ENB	East New Britain Province
ESOMAR	European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICAC	Independent Commission against Corruption
ICC	International Chamber of Commerce
LLG	Local Level Government
NCD	National Capital District
OPP	Open Parliament Project
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PSU	Primary Sampling Unit
REDD	Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation
SBCE	School Based Civic Education
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
TFS	Task Force Sweep
TI	Transparency International (Sometimes called the Transparency International Secretariat)
TIPNG	Transparency International Papua New Guinea
WAC	Walk Against Corruption
YACA	Youth Against Corruption Association
YDC	Youth Democracy Camp

Foreword

Transparency International Papua New Guinea was established in 1997, with Sir Anthony Siaguru, as its first Chairman. It was established solely because a group of Papua New Guinea citizens were concerned about the destructive consequences of growing corruption in our new nation and their strong belief in democracy and rule of law.

Since that time, corruption seems to have become an even more worrying problem. However, the only way we have had to measure it, was to rely on the international instrument applied by the Transparency International Secretariat, their annual Global Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). While we have had faith in this instrument, some in PNG have claimed that it is inaccurate, or that it does not take cultural factors into account. We do not agree. Although the CPI is not a survey of ordinary Papua New Guinea citizens, and the data for the CPI is collected through interviews with business leaders, analysts, and experts, we believe that the corruption trends it captures do reflect reality. It is worth mentioning here that the collection of CPI data and the subsequent analysis is done completely independent of the local chapter of Transparency International, as it should be.

To counteract criticism of the veracity of the CPI, we therefore decided to commission this survey to find out what ordinary Papua New Guinean citizens think. Their view aligns with ours regarding the seriousness of the problem, and that the CPI is indeed an accurate representation of the levels of corruption. For TIPNG, this is hardly surprising as much of the corruption, we witness is both unsophisticated and blatant.

However, we would call upon our partners to consider re-running this survey in other provinces to broaden the sample based and gauge the views of more PNG citizens throughout the nation.

There is much to be learnt from this report, particularly about the endemic nature of corruption in PNG and the rejection by PNG citizens of corruption as being a consequence of our culture, or that enough is being done to counteract corruption.

With the next Parliamentary Election coming soon, anyone thinking of contesting should remember the wise words of Abraham Lincoln, "You can fool some of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time." This survey shows clearly that the citizens of this country are not fooled.

Finally, I would like to thank DFAT for funding the survey and the staff of TIPNG and the contractor for producing this much needed report. I also wish to extend my gratitude to the survey respondents, my fellow citizens, who took the time to give us this invaluable data. I hope anyone in Government who reads it carefully will put combating the scourge of corruption in PNG, at the top of their agenda.

Lawrence Stephens

Chairman

Transparency International Papua New Guinea

"Corruption can be beaten if we work together. To stamp out the abuse of power, bribery and shed light on secret deals, citizens must together tell their governments they have had enough."

José Ugaz, Chair, Transparency International <u>www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table</u>

Executive Summary

Papua New Guinean citizens see corruption as a hugely damaging problem that is getting worse and which is not being genuinely tackled by the State.

The respondents to the survey were typical 'grassroots' PNG people; half were rural dwellers and only 25% had further education after school. Most did not own any of the items we would associate with even moderate wealth. While the sample size is small, it is representative of the provinces surveyed, and gives a good indication of what is experienced by people throughout the country as a whole.

While there is some confusion over exactly what defines corrupt actions, having a correct definition of corruption has a negligible influence on a respondent's experience or perception of corruption.

Perceptions of the Levels of Corruption

Certainly, there was no confusion over the extent to which corruption is seen as a problem in PNG; 76% said it is 'a very big problem' and 23% 'a big problem' (total 99%)! 90% felt it was getting worse as compared to 10 years ago. 79% thought that the level of corruption in PNG is significantly higher than other countries.

The importance of these particular results cannot be underestimated. While some claim that PNG's ranking on the Transparency International's Global Corruption Perception Index (CPI Rank position 139 in 2015) is inaccurate, the results of the survey (the collective opinion of PNG citizens) aligns with that finding.

Experience of Corruption

Three quarters said they had personally witnessed corrupt actions. A further 10% possibly had, but were not sure if it was actually corruption. Nearly two thirds said they had been a victim of corruption in the past year; 34% said 'yes, many times', 31% said 'yes, once or twice' (totalling 65%). A further 11% possibly were, but were not sure, if it was actually corruption. Bribery accounted for 48% of corrupt actions, followed by Misappropriation 30%, Impunity 11% and Nepotism 10%.

Men were significantly more likely than women to pay bribes (males 56%, females 37%). The higher-educated respondents and the 30-49 year age groups experienced somewhat higher incidencts of bribery than the lesser-educated and under-30 age groups.

When asked if they have been asked to, or forced to pay a bribe for a service that should be free (e.g. school enrolment) responses were fairly balanced.

25% of those asked or forced to pay bribes reported they paid bribes once a week or more, 31% said once or twice a month and 40% said once or twice a year. When asked about the value of the bribes demanded, 40% reported figures of K50 or less, 27% said about K50 up to K100 and 20% said K100 - K500. A further 13% reported figures over K500. It is difficult to accurately extrapolate this to the whole population, but a rough estimate puts the annual cost of bribes for services that should be provided free at hundreds of millions of Kina.

Consequences and Causes of Corruption

When asked about the consequences of those corrupt acts, most prominent were: 'some people get worse/no services' was cited by 40% of all respondents, 'human rights are abused' - 35%, 'wrongdoers get away without punishment' - 23%, 'levels of respect for Law go down' - 21% and 'Government lost money' 20%.

When asked what they think are the consequences for the country if corruption is not dealt with, most

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prominently, 53% of respondents feel that development will be reduced, 41% thought there will be reduced respect for laws and the same amount thought there would be reduced service provision.

81% of respondents saw Members of Parliament as the key causative agents of corruption; 54% cited the Prime Minister and Ministers; 53% of respondents cited Provincial and Local Level Government officials; 47% cited National Public service officials; and 25% cited 'Everyone'.

In trying to identify overall <u>which</u> public sectors were most involved, 75% of the respondents listed the Police in the top 3 sectors. 49% cited Elections staff in the top three worst, Education - 36%, Courts - 29%, Lands - 25%, Traffic - 22%, Health - 19%, Licensing Authorities - 11% and Tendering Boards - 11%

When asked about causes, 25% of the respondents cited 'people are short of money, so (they) resort to asking for bribes¹', as the most common cause of corruption in PNG. 10% said 'people are not aware they don't have to pay extra for services' and 10% said 'people have no choice, not strong enough to demand free service'.

Complicity in Corruption

When asked 'Under what circumstances would you be willing to be involved in a corrupt action?' 15% responded 'under <u>no</u> circumstances'. Others offered money-related reasons totalling 39%, or duress-related reasons totalling 43%. Clearly, while duress-induced corruption is unacceptable even if understandable, the focus of any mitigation should be on those who take advantage of the duress of others through rent seeking² by demanding bribes.

When asked if they have ever paid a bribe to get a service or better service, 53% of respondents said they had. Given that we are asking people to admit to an illegal action, this is an astonishingly, but sadly high figure. Another 38%, said never and 9% said 'no, but I considered it'.

All respondents were then asked 'In the last year, have you participated in a <u>minor</u> act of corruption to get a service to which you <u>were</u> entitled, simply because there was no other way to get that service?' 45% said Yes, and 55% said No. Clearly, for many citizens, this behaviour and the apparent collapse of public good entitlement has become normalised and thus corruption is morally sanctioned, even if illegal. There is no suggestion that people don't know that it is illegal to pay bribes.

Those who had paid bribes for entitled services were then asked in which area it had occurred. Education services accounted for 22% of bribery incidents, Police - 18%, Health - 18%, Courts - 7%, Land - 7%, and 4% each for Traffic Inspectors and other Government Departments and agencies.

All respondents were then asked, 'Have you ever participated in something that could be considered minor corruption to avoid a penalty, or to get something you were not entitled to (such as paying cash to a police officer?' to which 41% said Yes, 59% said No. Again, this is an astonishingly high figure as there were two elements of illegality here. The non-entitlement only reduced involvement by 4%!

Responses to which sector the participation occurred were: Police - 39%, Education - 16%, Courts - 11%, Traffic Inspectors - 11% and Health - 9%. The types of occurrence were most prominently Bribery - 58% and Impunity - 30%, while Misappropriation - 8% and Nepotism - 4% were much less cited. This is perhaps surprising given that "wantok business" is so often complained about. Of those who participated some 19% said it happened just once in the last year, 14% 2 or 3 times in the year, and 11% more than 4 times.

¹ Readers may wonder why 'people short of money so resort to asking for bribes' figures so prominently, especially given that those engaged in corruption on a very large scale are not short of money. We would suggest that this is because respondents were focussing on corrupt acts they had witnessed or been complicit in.

² The term rent seeking is used here to refer to when a position holder uses that position to make a private gain over and above the salary.

Respondents were then asked, 'Have you yourself, or someone close to you, participated in acts which could be considered as <u>major</u> acts of corruption?' to which 47% said Yes and 53% said No. Note that this is a higher percentage than for minor acts, presumably because we have included "someone close to you." Despite this we can see that both minor and major acts have become very common in the lives of ordinary Papua New Guineans.

When asked about the sectors for major corrupt acts, responses were: Police - 20%, Courts - 15%, Education - 14%, Elections - 13%, Land - 10% and Health - 8%. The types of occurrence most cited: were Bribery - 57% and Misappropriation - 23%, with Nepotism - 12% and Impunity - 8% much less cited.

Throughout the questions on participation in corrupt acts, respondents seemed to be forthright and open in their responses. The consistency of the figures across all the questions and demographics suggests that they were matter-of-fact responses to what has become an everyday factor encountered in their lives ('it is what it is') and suggests little or no personal consequence for complicity.

We can see some obvious commonalties here regarding involvement in corrupt acts:

- (a) involvement (willingly or not) in corrupt acts both on a minor and major scale is frequent. This suggests that a very high proportion of the population has been compromised, something that any corrupt leaders must be very happy about; and
- (b) certain sectors are often cited, some of which have a crucial role to play in combating corruption.

While there is no evidence to show that traditional culture is a causative factor, in that corrupt acts are acceptable practise (in fact, just the opposite seems to be believed) corruption has unfortunately become part of our everyday culture.

Tackling Corruption

Asked to what extent are current Government actions against corruption effective, only 2% said 'very effective' and 15% said 'effective'; against which 59% said 'ineffective' and 21% said 'very ineffective'. 77% of respondents believed the current effort of the Government against corruption was all or mainly for political gain with no genuine motivation.

Of those who had assessed Government efforts negatively, 48% cited 'political interference' as a cause, 15% cited 'lack of funding' and 15% cited 'inadequate powers'. 13% cited 'staff biased in favour of those who appointed them' and 8% believed that 'staff not motivated to do their jobs'. Some 6% thought that 'staff was scared to act.'

39% expressed a degree of satisfaction (12% very satisfied and 27% satisfied) with the government's handling of Task Force Sweep. However, 45% were dissatisfied. 44% expressed some positivity that the Government's proposed Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) will reduce corruption. Slightly more (53%) were less positive.

This suggests that the Government cannot claim a mandate to govern on the basis of its ability to deal with what citizens believe is the elephant in the room – Corruption!

21% of respondents thought that corruption in PNG is definitely fixable in their lifetimes. 49% said 'yes, probably'. When asked what must be done, many responses were given, but about half cited the need for a tougher response. A third of the suggestions were in line with TIPNG's aim to: 'raise public awareness' - 7%, 'have more transparency, so citizens can monitor Government actions' - 11% and 'change attitudes so it is considered unacceptable' 10%. The only other prominent suggestion was 'encourage people to go to church' - 13%.

70% felt that citizens could be doing more to combat corruption and 71% felt that they themselves were

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not doing enough. 29% said they had taken action against corruption. This is very high given the risks involved, but perhaps, not so surprising given the relatively high success rate. 42% of those who had taken action said they had been successful. Success rates were much higher in some provinces than others.

The remainder (61%) said they had not taken action, but 24% of those had not acted, but had considered doing so, 25% said no, but if they had known what to do, they would have acted.

Respondents who had acted were then asked what their action had been. A wide range of responses (\sim 30) was offered, but three quarters of them fell into four categories: reported to the police - 29%, reported to an elected leader - 26%, reported to a Government Department - 9% and reported to a community leader - 9%. A key point here is that despite apparent involvement of some Police in corrupt actions, clearly individuals within the police do work with citizens to act against corruption.

Asked what they think is the main reason some people do not take action against corruption, perhaps surprisingly, the most prominent response was: 'they benefit from the corrupt acts themselves' -29%. Other collusive-accepting responses were: 'they don't care' - 17%; and 'they think it is acceptable behaviour'.

13% thought that churches and other ethical leaders are taking a firm stand against corruption, whilst 42% thought it a 'firm stand, but should be more firm', and 34% said 'weak stand, should be more firm'.

68% of all the respondents thought TIPNG was very effectively fighting against corruption given its resources.

57% thought TIPNG should do more awareness, if it is to be more effective', 51% said 'more campaigns against corrupt acts' and 24% said 'prepare laws for parliament to consider'.

However, respondents' awareness of TIPNG's activities and understanding of its core functions appeared very low, especially outside urban areas. Readership of TI-PNG's magazine - *Tokaut* was slightly under half of those already familiar with TIPNG and most thought that content mix appropriate.

TIPNG should be worried about the lack of awareness of ALAC, OPP, Media statements, and TIPNG's advocacy on transparency. The other activities are highly localised, or as with SBCE, not yet rolled out so are of less concern.

So, while knowledge of activities and specific functions is low, knowledge of our existence and core mandate, given the effectiveness ratings, is much higher.

It is clear from these results that the scourge of corruption and its consequences is clearly recognized by the citizens of Papua New Guinea and even if they are sometimes complicit, it brings most citizens no long term benefit, only pain. We call upon the Government to read this entire report carefully and take urgent and far-reaching action to eliminate this cancer from our society.

Chapter 1:

Survey Background and Methodology

1.1 Project Overview

For Transparency International Papua New Guinea (TIPNG), and for that matter any agency, to work effectively to stop corruption, it needs to understand how large the problem is and what the citizenry know and think about corruption and their experiences with it. We also need to know to what extent the citizens believe Government and TIPNG and others are taking sufficient action against corruption.

TIPNG has indications of the extent of the problem through the TI Global Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), however, ordinary citizens (and particularly those living in rural areas where the majority of the population reside) are not normally reached by the Global CPI. The Global CPI has generally been viewed by government as not being an adequately robust assessment of relative levels of corruption in PNG. This survey, which assesses the views or ordinary citizens about the levels and consequences of corruption is a therefore a first.

TIPNG published an Invitation to Tender advertisement in September 2015 for the conduct of a survey of the general public's views on the levels and consequences of corruption in Papua New Guinea. The survey was funded by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Three proposals were received and a research company was selected as the data collection contractor in October 2015. This document presents TIPNG analysis of the survey results along with our policy recommendations.

TIPNG is a member of the global Transparency International movement, fighting against corruption whilst promoting openness, honesty and accountability in both the public and private sectors. TIPNG does not support any politicians or political parties, and instead focuses on strengthening the integrity systems such as parliament, police and judiciary.

1.2 Research Methodology

This research was essentially quantitative in nature, conducting face to face interviews with a robust sample of Papua New Guineans across all four of PNG's ethno-cultural regions. TIPNG staff were not present for these interviews.

1.2.1 Discussion of sampling systems

Survey samples must reflect the essential characteristics of the target population whilst remaining realistic, practical and fool-proof in practice. Multi-strata quota sampling is by far the most useful in PNG and has been used and refined for over 20 years.

The multi-strata quota system used here allows the security of daytime interviewing of total strangers in public places with random selection of respondents and easily managed systems and quality control; it is practical and fool-proof in administration.

1.2.2 Multi-strata Design; Regional

The details for overall sample and strata quotas were agreed in consultation, taking account of TIPNG preferences and budgetary and timeline parameters. The Regional quotas were decided as equally split across the regions but with a 'magnifying glass' (by oversized quota) for Port Moresby and surrounding Central Province as the central point of National Government Offices, Departments, functions, systems and activities. Locational quotas were finalised as:

• Port Moresby Urban, inside city limits

sample n=250+

•	Central Province, (outside NCD limits, 20-~50kms out)	sample n= 250+
•	Lae (n=125+) & Morobe villages (n=125+) (<~50kms)	sample n= 250+
•	Goroka (n=125+) & EHP villages (n=125+) (<~50kms)	sample n= 250+
•	Kokopo (n=125+) & ENB villages (n=125+) (<~50kms)	sample n= 250+

Total sample (minimum overall) sample n= 1250

1.2.3 Urban/rural segmentation


Sampling quotas for urban/rural throughout were finalised as 50:50 within geographical zones as defined by typically used stratification in social and media surveying:

- Urban living inside town/city boundaries of the city/provincial capital,
- Rural (peri-urban) villages 20-50 kilometres outside the city/town boundaries.

1.2.4 Gender and Age Group

To best meet the sampling requirements, across all locations, age and gender strata, the sampling was based on the National Statistics Office national population pyramid.

The gender ratio used was 50:50. Males marginally outnumber females in the population but gender is typically split evenly across all sample units in surveying.



The age group segmentation was drawn from the national population pyramid; under-18s (who make up 46% of the population) were discarded as being minors and non-voters. The remaining 54% were then divided according to their relative presence in the pyramid. The National Population pyramid is markedly bottom-heavy as can be seen reflected in final quota grids.

1.2.5 Final Quota Grids used

The same sampling design was applied across all locational strata, but with a double-sized sample used for National Capital District and surrounds.

Grid A: for Momase, Highlands and Niugini Islands sampling:

Table 1: Sample quotas for Momase, Highlands and Niugini Islands

	Momase, Hig	Momase, Highlands, Islands Regional Sample n=250 minimum							
	Urban (128)		Rural (128)						
Age group	M (64)	F(64)	M(64)	F(64)					
18-29 (38%)	24	24	24	24					
30-44 (36%)	23	23	23	23					
45-59 (20%)	13	13	13	13					
60+ yrs (6%)	4	4	4	4					
Total (100%)	64	64	64	64					

Grid B: NCD & Central quotas were doubled (with one all urban, one all rural):

Table 2: Sample quotas for National Capital District and Central Province

	NCD & Central Regional Total Sample n=500 minimum							
	NCD – all Url	oan (256)	Central villages - Rural (256					
Age group	M (128)	M (128)	M (128)	M (128)				
18-29 (38%)	48	48	48	48				
30-44 (36%)	46	46	46	46				
45-59 (20%)	26	26	26	26				
60+ yrs (6%)	8	8	8	8				
Total (100%)	128	128	128	128				

NB. With above grids, the specification was for 250 (125 urban: 125 rural) locational samples. In drawing up the grids, numbers were marginally rounded up to allow whole number integers (and allow for possible discards in quality control processing whilst still achieving specified minimum samples).

1.2.6 Implementation/Practice

Respondents were randomly selected on the basis of age and gender at a number of locations of high traffic such as markets and congregation areas outside business parks, government offices, etc. Primary sampling units (PSUs) were selected (also randomly but within set geo-parameters) for each region/location.

The contractor fieldwork team (eight interviewers overseen by two supervisors, travelled together as a team in a vehicle) at nominated locations (PSUs). As per standard practice the team obtained permission in village and community settings from a local elder or councillor to proceed before interviewing commenced. Interviewing was same-gender, males interviewing males and females interviewing females. Interviewing teams were therefore made up of equal numbers of male and female interviewers.

Supervisors allocated interviewers their tasks in line with age group/gender quotas and the interviewers spread out looking for a respondent matching their task at this PSU (e.g. find and interview a female 18-29 years old, or 30-44, say).

Supervisors oversaw interviews, collected and checked completed questionnaires and kept tally against designated quotas; they then allocated new tasks for the next location accordingly. Cluster size limits were usually 2 interviews per interviewer per location, though at less-populated locations the cluster was in some cases limited to only one each.

PSUs were typically selected on the following basis: coverage (PSUs spread across North, South, East and West parts to ensure broad coverage of the local population); logistics (viability to get to the PSU given local conditions) and security (PSUs safe for the Field Team to travel to and operate within).

There were more designated PSU lists than were actually needed to allow for conditions on the ground (landslips, floods, washed-out roads, civil insurrection, tribal fights, etc.); they were drawn as 'primary target locations' and 'back-up locations', primary targets to be sampled unless problems arose.

1.3 Quality Control

Standard operating procedures ensured quality control standards equalling or exceeding normal research industry standards. A supervisor-to-interviewer ratio of one supervisor to four interviewers ensured around 25% of interviews were overseen in progress, and completed questionnaires were checked as fieldwork progressed.

The supervisors were given 'ownership' and continued oversight throughout the data collection, resulting in excellent standardization across regions. NCD was the starting point, after which the supervisory pair flew to the next region to retrain and lead the local team until completion; then flew to next region, and so on.

In a further quality control process at the research company's Head Office, 10% of respondents (randomly selected from among those with telephone numbers) received call-backs to check that the interview took place and that the respondents were happy with the interviewer's manner and conduct of the interview.

The research company operated further quality control processes relating to data entry (e.g. manual cross-checking by other data entry staff and management, and the application of standard data-cleaning programs on importation to SPSS for analysis and reporting).

1.4 Survey Materials

The questionnaire was designed by TIPNG and then reviewed by an officer of the National Research Institute (NRI) and Dr. Sarah Dix who both offered helpful advice in its design and wording. As is the contractor's standard policy, the questionnaire had TokPisin translations added to the original English, and was piloted in Port Moresby before amendment and final approval by the client. As is similar standard practice, all openended responses were translated back into English for data entry.

1.5 Standards and Ethics

The research company works to the world-class professional standards, codes and ethics formulated by ESOMAR (www.esomar.com) and the ICC (International Chamber of Commerce). The research company was admitted to ESOMAR Corporate Membership several years ago.

The contractor is also fully familiar with local cultural and societal norms which it always takes care to respect in conducting its research (such as courtesy requests to community leaders before starting work in their locale and observing sensitive protocols in dealing with women and children).



Taxpayers from a village carrying materials to build a clinic because of an impassable road in Western Province.

Chapter 2: Survey Findings

2.1 Introduction

Transparency International PNG Inc. (TIPNG) is a member of the global Transparency International movement, fighting against corruption whilst promoting openness, honesty and accountability in both the public and private sectors. TIPNG does not support any politicians or political parties, and instead focuses on strengthening the integrity systems such as parliament, police and judiciary.

As part of TIPNG's efforts towards effectively fighting corruption while promoting openness, honesty and accountability, it is imperative to understand the concept of corruption, its magnitude and its impact from the standpoint of the PNG citizenry. In this regard, this survey sought to assess: the citizenry's awareness and knowledge of corruption; their personal experience including involvement in corruption; the extent of corruption in PNG as a whole and specific to selected government sectors; the perceived attendant consequences of corruption; their perceptions on the government's fight against corruption; and awareness and knowledge of TIPNG and its activities.

2.2 Understanding corruption

According to the annual TI CPI³, corruption refers to the misuse of entrusted power for private gain, thus encompassing corrupt practices in both the public and private sectors. Survey results show varied conceptual understanding of what corruption means and entails. With four choices, 27% of the surveyed respondents correctly defined corruption as specified by TI⁴ but limited to the public sector. Similar proportions of respondents (25%) thought that corruption is "any illegal action" or "all actions that are wrong and immoral" while 22% defined corruption as "the stealing of money from the government". A further one percent of respondents were unable to define corruption. This is shown in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1: Survey respondents understanding of the term "corruption" (N=1280)

Knowledge or understanding of what corruption means varies with the demographic features of the survey respondents. While no significant differences were observed across gender and age groups with regard to knowledge of the correct working definition of corruption, the level of knowledge of the correct working definition of corruption increased proportionally with an increase in the level of education. And conversely, responses indicating misinterpretation of the term corruption or a total lack of knowledge of what corruption means were mainly provided by respondents who had attained grade 1 to 3 or with no

 $^{^{\}rm 3}$ Published by the Transparency International Secretariat, which is based in Berlin

⁴ The definition used by the TI movement is "the misuse of entrusted power for private gain" This then includes the misuse of both powers in the private and public sectors. In the questionnaire we used wrongly gave "the misuse of a public position for private gain"

education at all and had the lowest total fortnightly household income. This is depicted in Tables 3 and 4 below.

Definition of corruption Age Bands Between Male Female Between Between Between 60 + 18 and 30 and 40 and 50 and years 49 years 59 years 29 years 39 years All actions that are wrong and immoral 25% 17% 32% 23% 27% 28% 25% 22% When someone in a public position abuses 27% 27% 25% 32% 26% 27% 28% 27% the power they have so they personally gain The stealing of money from government 22% 24% 21% 24% 21% 20% 20% 28% Any illegal action 32% 19% 26% 26% 26% 23% 23% Don't know 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% Total 1280 640 640 480 393 200 120 87

Table 3: Defining corruption by sex and age

Table 4: Defining corruption by level of education attained

Definition of corruption	Total			Educati	on Level		
		No schooling	Grades	Grade 9	Technical or	College	University
		at all or	4 to	to 12	Vocational		
		grades 1 - 3	grade 8		school		
All actions that are wrong and immoral	25%	38%	29%	20%	18%	25%	20%
When someone in a public position abuses	27%	16%	18%	30%	32%	38%	46%
the power they have so they personally gain							
The stealing of money from government	22%	22%	29%	23%	23%	10%	11%
Any illegal action	25%	21%	23%	27%	27%	28%	23%
DK	1%	3%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Number of respondents	1280	113	377	464	95	151	80

There was only fairly minor variation in understanding by province, though NCD and Lae/Morobe returned more accurate responses by a few percentage points and Eastern Highlands returned less accurate responses, tending to favour corruption as being anything wrong or immoral or illegal actions.

This aligns with the 2013 TIPNG Corruption Perceptions Survey⁵ (Not to be confused with the global CPI) conducted in nine provinces, which surveyed how PNG citizens understood the term corruption.

Key findings were that:

- 1. Many saw corruption as any immoral action. ⁶
- 2. Few knew/agreed with the standard dictionary or TI accepted meaning.
- 3. Incidents that conflicted with cultural norms, for example sexual, were seen as more "wrong" than incidents that traditional cultural norms would not have a view about. For example, a politician sleeping with a prostitute was more wrong than awarding a defence contract to a relative.
- 4. That corruption was for some made more acceptable if the corrupt person shared the illicit gains with his or her relatives.

2.3 Extent of corruption in PNG

The results show that more than three in every four PNG citizens (76%) believe that corruption is a "very big problem" and a further 23% believe it to be a big problem.

While 99% see corruption as a major problem in the country, only 1% felt that corruption is either a small or very small problem. This virtual unanimity of opinion was noted across all provinces. The overall perception is shown in Figure 2 below.

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 $^{^{\}rm 5}$ As with this publication this research is downloadable from $\underline{\text{www.transparency.org.pg}}$

⁶ A similar result was found in Poland by Kubiak.

A very big problem, 76%

A big problem, 23%

A small problem, 0.7%

A very small problem, 0.1%

Don't know, 0.2%

Figure 2: Perceived extent of corruption in PNG (N=1280)

In addition, survey results show that these beliefs about corruption in PNG cuts across all demographic segments namely gender, age group and level of education and income. This is shown in Tables 5, 6 and 7 below.

Extent of Corruption in	Total	S	ex	Age Bands				
PNG		Male	Female	Between 18 and 29 years	Between 30 and 39 years	Between 40 and 49 years	Between 50 and 59 years	60 + years
A very big problem	76%	78%	74%	76%	75%	73%	84%	78%
A big problem	23%	21%	25%	23%	24%	27%	16%	21%
A small problem	0.7%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%
A very small problem	0.1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%
Don't know	0.2%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Number of respondents	1280	640	640	480	393	200	120	87

Table 5: Extent of corruption in PNG by sex and age

	_			
Table 6: Extent o	f corruntion	in PNG h	v level o	f education attained
Tubic of Externe o	, comaption		,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	j caacation attained

Extent of corruption in	Total	tal Education Level					
PNG		No schooling at all or grades 1 - 3	Grades 4 to 8	Grade 9 to 12	Technical or Vocational school	College	University
A very big problem	25%	82%	70%	75%	77%	85%	80%
A big problem	27%	16%	28%	24%	21%	15%	20%
A small problem	22%	0%	1%	1%	2%	0%	0%
A very small problem	25%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Don't know	1%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Number of respondents	1280	113	377	464	95	151	80

Table 7: Extent of corruption in PNG by total household income in a fortnight

Extent of corruption in PNG	Total	Total Household Income in a fortnight					
		Less than	100 - 500	500 -	1000 - 2000	2000 Kina	DK
		100 Kina	Kina	1000 Kina	Kina	Plus	
A very big problem	25%	77.2%	73.9%	75.7%	80.6%	76.5%	78.4%
A big problem	27%	21.7%	24.6%	23.9%	18.5%	23.5%	19.6%
A small problem	22%	0.4%	1.1%	0.3%	0.8%	0.0%	2.0%
A very small problem	25%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Don't know	1%	0.7%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Number of respondents	1280	281	468	305	124	51	51

A nearly two-thirds majority of surveyed respondents (65%) across all provinces believe that corruption is getting much worse as compared to ten years ago and a further 25% believe it is getting worse (negative opinions totalling 90%). As observed in Figure 3 below, this perception is shared by both males and females surveyed.




Figure 3: Perceived change in the level of corruption in PNG (N=1280)

Asked whether the level of corruption in PNG is higher or lower as compared to other countries, nearly half of the respondents surveyed (47%) perceive corruption as much higher in PNG as compared to other countries. There was a gender difference in this result, with more males (58%) expressing this view than females (42%). In total 79% of respondents think it is higher or much higher. On the other hand, 13% of the respondents surveyed, mainly females, felt that the level of corruption in PNG is less than it is in other countries. This is shown in Figure 4 below.




Figure 4: Perceived level of corruption in PNG as compared to other countries (N=1280)

The views of citizens align with the TI Global Ranking in the Corruption Perceptions Index in which PNG is ranked as 139 out of 168 countries, with the most corrupt countries being Somalia and North Korea equally ranking 167th. (See full table in the annexes.) Each country is also given a score with 100 being very clean and 0 being highly corrupt. PNG has a score of 25. Table 8 below shows PNG's CPI results since 2012. Note that the score is more important, as the ranking is relative. A better ranking may simply indicate increased corruption in other countries not reduced corruption in PNG.

Table 8: Extent of corruption in PNG by Annual CPI Ranking and Score

Year	Position Ranking	Score
2015	139	25
2014	145	25
2013	144	25
2012	150	25

2.4 Citizens' experience with corruption

Especially considering the sensitive nature of the topic of corruption and attendant anxieties that could result from questioning survey respondents on it, results reveal that respondents were remarkably open on the subject. This appears to be because they regard corruption as a commonplace everyday affair in their lives and therefore little more sensitive than talking about the weather. It also suggests that the likelihood of getting caught is very low. This we would speculate is probably because so many potential complainants have been compromised by participation (under duress or not) in corrupt acts.

As observed in Figure 5 below, nearly three in every four (74.9%) of the survey respondents have personally witnessed corrupt actions with a further analysis by sex revealing that more males (60%) as compared to females (42%) reporting having personally witnessed actions of corruption. This may well be a function of gender duty demarcation: – possibly males overall are responsible for more transactions that are likely to involve corruption. It may also be due to reduced social mobility for females and or illiteracy.

100.0%■ Yes I saw the actions myself 80.0% Yes I saw some of the actions myself 59.8% 60.0% ■ Possibly, but I am 51.2% not sure, if it was 42.5% corruption 40.0% ⊟ No 26.4% 23.7% 20.9% 14.8% DK 20.0% 9.2% 9.5% 0.0% Total Male Female

Figure 5: Level of witnessing acts of corruption in PNG (N=1280)

So not only do people perceive corruption as a serious problem, which is getting worse, a very high percentage has witnessed it. This is further proof that the CPI is objective and accurate.

There was no significant variation by province of perceived or witnessed levels of corruption. This is significant as despite the often repeated view that people from certain regions commit higher levels of crime, or are in some way "bad", corruption seems equally prevalent everywhere. A later question on who causes corruption also largely rules out people from particular regions or ethnicities.

Respondents who had higher household income and/or had attained college or university education as compared to other education levels were more likely to have witnessed corrupt actions. As we show later this may be because being more educated and or wealthy means they are more likely to be targets or in closer proximity to government agencies. This disaggregation is shown in Tables 9 and 10 below.

TIPNG Public Opinion Survey Report

Table 9: Witnessing of corruption in PNG by level of education


Ever witnessed corruption in PNG	Total			Educatio	n Level		
		No schooling at all or grades 1 - 3	Grades 4 to grade 8	Grade 9 to 12	Technical or Vocational school	College	University
Yes I saw the actions myself	51.2%	49.6%	44.8%	48.5%	55.8%	65.6%	66.3%
Yes I saw some of the actions myself	23.7%	20.4%	24.7%	25.6%	18.9%	20.5%	23.8%
Possibly, but I am not sure, if it was corruption	10.1%	10.6%	12.5%	8.8%	13.7%	7.9%	5.0%
No	14.8%	17.7%	18.0%	16.8%	11.6%	6.0%	5.0%
Don't know	0.2%	1.8%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Number of respondents	1280	113	377	464	95	151	80

Table 10: Witnessing of corruption in PNG by total household income in a fortnight

Extent of corruption in PNG	Total		Total I	Household Inco	me in a fortnigh	nt	
		Less than	100 - 500	500 - 1000	1000 - 2000	2000	DK
		100 Kina	Kina	Kina	Kina	Kina Plus	
Yes I saw the actions myself	51.2%	49.1%	48.7%	51.5%	62.9%	56.9%	49.0%
Yes I saw some of the actions myself	23.7%	24.6%	25.9%	22.3%	19.4%	21.6%	19.6%
Possibly, but I am not sure, if it was corruption	10.1%	10.7%	11.3%	9.8%	7.3%	7.8%	5.9%
No	14.8%	15.3%	13.7%	16.4%	10.5%	13.7%	25.5%
Don't know	0.2%	0.4%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Number of respondents	1280	281	468	305	124	51	51

To buttress the above findings, a further line of questioning to those who had experienced corruption as a victim (a subset of 1062 respondents) shows that 65% of these have been victims of corruption at least once in the last year (34% many times and 31% once or twice). Another 23% said that they have not suffered from corruption in the last year and 11% were uncertain if they had been victims of corruption. This reveals the endemic and social nature of corruption which seems to be regarded by respondents as a real and constant feature of their everyday lives. Figure 6 below shows the incidence of being a victim of corrupt actions as reported by survey respondents.

Figure 6: Frequency of being a victim of corruption in PNG (N=1280)



We can see that 40% of men and 27% of women have experienced corruption many times, showing a striking gender difference. This could because they are more likely to stay at home and less likely to interact with corrupt officials, or it could be because they are less aware of what constitutes corruption.⁷

The picture was fairly consistent across the provinces (although in EHP corruption was witnessed/suffered many times by 48% of respondents) but notably high returns were in NCD in police sector corruption (39%) and Eastern Highlands in Education (26%). While no major differences were observed across the age groups, it was noted that survey respondents who had attained college or university education had suffered more from corruption as compared to other respondents. While this observation is not further dissected by the study, it could partly be attributed to awareness of what corruption entails and therefore ability to specify its occurrence. It may also be due to their presumed higher earning capacity and greater economic status and involvement in business matters, which may make them targets. This is shown in Table 11 below.

Victim of corruption in PNG	Total			Educa	tion Level		
		No schooling at all or grades 1 - 3	Grades 4 to grade 8	Grade 9 to 12	Technical or Vocational school	College	University
Yes, many times	33.9%	40.7%	30.5%	31.3%	28.4%	43.0%	45.0%
Yes, once or twice	31.5%	24.8%	32.4%	31.3%	35.8%	32.5%	31.3%
Possibly, but I am not sure, if it was corruption	11.4%	12.4%	11.9%	12.5%	9.5%	8.6%	8.8%
No	22.9%	21.2%	24.9%	25.0%	25.3%	15.2%	15.0%
Don't know	0.3%	0.9%	0.3%	0.0%	1.1%	0.7%	0.0%
Number of respondents	1280	113	377	464	95	151	80

Table 11: Victim of corruption in PNG by level of education

The most common forms of corrupt acts that respondents have been victims of or witnessed are bribery, reported by nearly half (48%) overall. This was fairly consistent across the provinces but notably higher (61%) in Eastern Highlands. Misappropriation was cited by 30% of respondents; other forms of corrupt actions reported were at lower incidences, e.g. impunity (11%) and nepotism (10%), as shown in Figure 7 below.




Figure 7: The most common forms of corruption in PNG (N=1280)

When analysed by public sector as is shown in Table 12 below, bribery as a form of corrupt act was linked to nearly all public sectors. Most prominently, 73% of all respondents witnessed and/or suffered corruption in relation to elections, courts (66%), licensing authorities (64%), land (59%), traffic inspectors (52%) and police (51%). This shows an interwoven but informal network of corruption in key public sectors.

⁷ Research by the Papua New Guinea Education Advocacy Network challenges the often held view that literacy is 55% and suggests that it is far lower especially amongst rural women. See bibliography.

Misappropriation was mainly associated with tendering boards (36%) as well as health (37%) and education sectors (32%). Nepotism as a corruption act based on kinship or political or social factionalism was mainly associated with the tendering boards (24%)[e.g. *awarding contracts to relatives*] while impunity was dominant amongst traffic inspectors (26%) and police (28%) in general.

Sector		Тур	e of corruption incident			
	Misappropriation	Nepotism (Hiring	Bribery (Where	Impunity (Where a	Other	DK
	(Private use or theft of	or giving of	goods or cash is	public official, often		
	government goods or	contracts based	given or offered in	in return for a bribe		
	money by public office	on relationship to	return for a service	or withdrawal of a		
	holders for private	public office	that the person is	threat, prevents the		
	use)	holder)	not entitled to)	law being applied)		
Health	37.1%	11.4%	42.9%	8.6%	0.0%	0.0%
Education/Schools	32.5%	17.8%	48.7%	.5%	0.5%	0.0%
Traffic Inspectors	10.0%	12.0%	52.0%	26.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Police	15.4%	5.1%	51.4%	28.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Land	15.9%	13.0%	59.4%	11.6%	0.0%	0.0%
Courts	13.8%	6.2%	66.2%	13.8%	0.0%	0.0%
Elections	17.1%	8.1%	73.2%	1.6%	0.0%	0.0%
Licensing Authorities	21.4%	7.1%	64.3%	7.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Tendering Boards	36.0%	24.0%	36.0%	4.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Other	73.6% ⁸	9.2%	14.9%	2.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Don't know	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Total	30.2%	10.3%	47.9%	11.2%	.1%	.4%
No. of respondents	313	107	497	116	1	4

Table 12: Types of corruption in PNG by sector

From the above analysis, we can see that citizens are more vulnerable to corruption from transacting with public officials in some sectors than others. This is especially so in sectors providing access to key but basic social services such as health, education and law and order/justice.

2.5 Bribery as an act of corruption

Bribery involves several elements: the giver and taker of the bribe, a mutual understanding regarding giving the bribe, value of the bribe, the exchange of the bribe and violation of a standard (Kubiak, 2001). To assess bribery incidents, the respondents were asked to declare if they have been asked to or forced to

pay a bribe for a service that should be free, the frequency of parting with such bribes and an indication of the value of the bribes.

Survey results show that 46% of the survey respondents, paid a bribe for a service that they know that they are entitled to without charge in the past year. (56% males and 37% females) Another 48% said they had not, as observed in Figure 8 below. Approximately 5% of the survey respondents parted with bribes for services which they were not sure of their entitlement.



This child is a possible victim of corruption if a bribe was paid for a free service or compromised medicines were used.

⁸ The 73% other under misappropriation is probably made up of general theft not easily assignable and perhaps from local government bodies.




Figure 8: Proportion of respondents who have been asked or forced to give a bribe in PNG for a free service (N=1280)

This clearly demonstrates that citizens know when they are victims of this type of corruption. This level of corruption makes a mockery of such potentially worthy policies as "Tuition Free Education". Instead government should make it a priority to eliminate these illegal costs. Not only do these costs degrade the sector, they fall most heavily on those not working in the public sector who are least able to pay or extract bribes.

Furthermore, if public officials in one sector can get away with "rent seeking" in their positions then we can expect that officials in other sectors will try to supplement their incomes to help pay bribes the other sector official are demanding, thus compounding the problem. This also probably explains why public servants in PNG, who are generally well paid in comparison to other countries, turn to corruption.

For bribery in the last year, results varied across the provinces. See Figure 9 below. Note that respondents in ENB province with similar education and income levels as in other provinces, report lower levels of corruption reported and as we see later, the frequency of occurrence is less.




Figure 9: Proportion who have been asked or forced to give a bribe for a free service by province (N=1280)

Interestingly, bribery incidents are more common among the middle age groups of 30 to 39 years and 40 to 49 years as compared to the lower age group of 18 to 29 years and the upper age groups of 50 years and above. This is presumably at least in part because the 30-49 groups are more economically active and therefore more attractive targets.

In addition, survey results show that respondents who have attained college and university education have experienced more incidents of bribery as compared to respondents who have attained lower education levels (again, presumably because the higher-educated groups are more economically active). This is shown in Tables 13 and 14 below.

Asked to or forced to pay a bribe for	Total	al Education Level							
a free service		No schooling or grades 1 – 3 only	Grades 4 to grade 8	Grade 9 to 12	Technical or Vocational school	College	University		
Yes	46.4%	46.0%	39.5%	45.3%	46.3%	57.0%	66.3%		
No	10 10/	12 E9/	E / 00/	EO 60/	4E 20/	20.70/	20 00/		

5.0%

0.5%

4.1%

0.0%

8.4%

0.0%

3.3%

0.0%

3.8%

1.3%

10.6%

0.9%

Table 13: A cross analysis of payment of a bribe through being asked or coerced by level of education attainment

Asked to or forced to pay a bribe for	Total		Age Bands							
a free service		Between 18	Between 30	Between 40 and	Between 50 and	60 + years				
		and 29 years	and 39 years	49 years	59 years					
Yes	46.4%	45.8%	49.6%	47.5%	44.2%	35.6%				
No	48.1%	49.2%	46.3%	46.0%	47.5%	56.3%				
Not sure if the service should be free	5.2%	5.0%	4.1%	6.0%	7.5%	5.7%				
Don't know	0.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.8%	2.3%				
Number of respondents	1280	480	393	200	120	87				

Table 14: A cross analysis of payment of a bribe through being asked or coerced by age groups

2.5.1 **Frequency**

Not sure if the service should be free

Don't know

Number of respondents

5.2%

0.3%

1280

Among the respondents who had declared that they had been asked or forced to pay a bribe for a service that should be free in the past year (46% of all respondents), a majority of 56% had done this at least once a month (25% once a week or more and 31% once or twice a month). Figures were mainly consistent across the provinces with only East New Britain lower (35% once a month or more). The overall picture is shown in Figure 10 below.




Figure 10: Frequency of payment of a bribe through being asked or coerced (n=594)

A considerable proportion of the 25% of respondents who are complicit in corrupt actions could be categorized as "routine" participants in bribery acts since they were disproportionately involved in bribery interactions at least once or more times a week. As shown in Table 14 below, these were largely males with higher household income.

Nevertheless, the lower income brackets of less than K100 and K100-500 constitute a considerable proportion of respondents who declared having given bribes for service that should be free once a week or more. This shows that corruption in PNG cares little for the level of household income.

We should be clear here about what this cost is for. The cost does not add quality or efficiency. In fact, corruption often leads to us paying over and above our taxes for mostly a sub-standard service. This is because the quality has been degraded by the inability of the various parts of the service to work effectively together, now degraded by the need for all actors at different stages to seek rent through bribes, misappropriation or nepotism. Furthermore, we can be sure these illicit gains will be untaxed income.

Frequency of giving	Total	Ge	nder	Level of household income						
bribes		Male	Male Female		100 -	500 -	1000 -	2000	Don't	
				than	500 Kina	1000	2000	Kina	know	
				100 Kina		Kina	Kina	Plus		
Once a week or more	25%	28%	19%	18%	21%	28%	33%	29%	32%	
Once or twice a month	31%	33%	29%	30%	30%	35%	36%	22%	27%	
Once or twice a year	40%	34%	50%	49%	45%	32%	28%	50%	41%	
Not sure	4%	4%	3%	4%	5%	3%	3%	0%	0%	
Number of respondents	594	358	236	101	220	158	61	32	22	

Table 15: A cross analysis of frequency of payment of a bribe through being asked or coerced by gender and level of household income in a fortnight

Given Papua New Guinea's 2015 estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of US\$ 2,856.679 and its ranking among the poorest countries in the world (#152 out of 185 countries), the declared worth of the bribes given by respondents in our survey shows that the level of corruption is hardly modest. Indeed, it is imposing a tremendous cost on citizens. The bribe amount pattern varied little across provinces, but 'petty' bribes (<K20) were cited slightly more in Morobe (26%) and EHP (22%) than elsewhere; in NCD <K20 bribes were only 10% (K20 seemingly too petty as a starting price in the capital city). While only 13% of respondents had given bribes worth more than 500 Kina, nearly a half (47%) of respondents parted with bribes worth K51- 500. Only 18% declared giving bribes valued at less than K20. This is illustrated in Figure 11 below.




Figure 11: Value of bribe paid through being asked or coerced (n=594)

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⁹ Global Finance Magazine: <u>www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/worlds-richest-and-poorest-countries</u>

A cross analysis of the value of the bribes and the frequency of giving bribes shows a picture of corruption involving both lower and higher income earners at alarming frequency. We can see from Table 16 below that of 18% of the bribes given for services that are free are worth less than 20 kina. Another 22% of those bribes are given once week or more. 27% of all the bribes are worth between 51 and 100 kina but 21% of these are given once a week or more and 35% are given one or twice a month. Overall we can see that well over half (25% and 31%) of all bribes declared to be given to gain access to free services are given once a twice a month or more which suggests that bribe giving is become normalised.

Value of bribe		Frequency	of giving bribe		
	Once a week or	Once or twice a	Once or twice a	Don't know	Total
	more	month	year		
Less than 20 Kina	22%	39%	37%	2%	18%
Between 21 & 50 Kina	34%	32%	30%	4%	22%
Between 51 & 100 Kina	21%	35%	41%	3%	27%
Between 101 & 500 Kina	23%	20%	51%	6%	20%
Between 501 & 2,000 Kina	18%	33%	45%	4%	8%
More than 2, 000 Kina	30% ¹⁰	27%	43%	0%	5%
Don't know	0%	33%	67%	0%	1%
Total	25%	31%	40%	4%	100%

Table 16: A cross analysis of value of bribes paid annually by frequency of giving bribe

We have tried to extrapolate the total cost of corrupt acts for services that citizens are entitled to without charge by calculating the number of incidents and multiplying that by the average bribe size and then scaling that up to the percentage of the population over 18 who seem willing to participate. This indicates that there are millions of incidents per year worth hundreds of millions of kina for services that are supposed to be free because the taxpayer has already paid for them! While we cannot be sure of the exact amount we can be sure that when even small bribes get multiplied the cost and damage to an economy can be staggering.

2.6 Justification for Participation in Corrupt Actions

When asked under what circumstances they would be willing to be involved in a corrupt action, only 15% responded categorically 'no, not under any circumstances'. Approximately, one in four (26%) of the

surveyed respondents, mainly males (35%) as compared to females (18%), cited being willing in situations where they would save themselves from spending large amounts of money by participation in corrupt actions. Other circumstances include: if their lives or lives of family members or friends are threatened (18%); if their health or health of family members or friends are threatened (14%); situations where they would save themselves from spending small amounts of money (13%); and if a significant amount of their wealth or wealth of family members or friends was threatened (8%). This is illustrated in Figure 12 below. The results did not differ significantly by income, education or province.



The cost of corruption, poor roads in Central means often impassable roads are normal and damage to vehicles is also high.

¹⁰ This percentage seems astonishingly high and may be an error. However, given that it is only 5% of the total it is not significant.




Figure 12: Circumstances in which one would be willing to be involved in corrupt actions (N=1280)

Since there are two parties involved in bribery, it is interesting to establish from an economic perspective whether the bribery incidents are largely supply driven or demand driven. If the ratio of *respondents who* were asked to or coerced to give bribes to respondents that were not asked or coerced to give bribes but still gave a bribe is less than 1, then the incidence of bribery can be considered as supply driven; if more than 1, it is considered as demand driven.

When asked whether they have ever paid a bribe to get a service or better service without being asked or coerced, approximately 53% of all respondents surveyed replied in the affirmative. This is shown in Figure 13 below.




Figure 13: Level of paying of bribes without coercion but due to the feeling that that one cannot get a service unless they pay something extra

So is corruption in PNG supply or demand driven? As found earlier, 46% of all survey respondents replied affirmatively when asked if they have been asked to or forced to pay a bribe and gave one. The ratio of 46:53 or 0.87 suggests that payment of bribes is driven slightly more by supply rather than demand. However, this cannot be regarded as a firm conclusion; within a scenario of entrenched corruption and often duress, the bribe payer may well see it as an accepted and largely unavoidable expectation and make

the transaction without being specifically asked to do so. This is something that could be looked into more deeply.

As illustrated in Table 17 below, the main key service areas or sectors affected by non-coerced incidents of bribery are: health (23%), education/schools (21%); and land (13%). We can assume therefore that in other sectors it is more driven by demand in that the bribe taker asks for the bribe. We can also see that non-coercive bribing occurs in service delivery areas where strong emotions and very serious consequences are likely for non-payment. In these cases it would be reasonable to say that the bribe giver could be acting under considerable duress. For example, a parent may offer a bribe to get medicine for a sick child or to gain a place in a school (where because of corruption, merit based selection may not be working).

Ever		Service area/sector									
paid bribe	Health	Education/ Schools	Traffic Inspectors	Police	Land	Courts	Elections	Licensing Authorities	Tendering Boards	Other	Total
Yes, many times	26%	23%	4%	6%	12%	6%	3%	3%	2%	15%	100%
Yes, a few times	22%	20%	5%	6%	13%	6%	6%	5%	1%	15%	100%
Total	23%	21%	5%	6%	13%	6%	5%	4%	2%	15%	100%

Table 17: A cross analysis of frequency of payment of a bribe without being asked or coerced by service area/sector

2.7 Participation in minor and major acts of corruption

From here on some questions ask about issues similar to those asked earlier to help us confirm what is happening.

Respondents were asked if they have participated in <u>minor</u> acts of corruption to get a service that they <u>were</u> entitled to. A large number (45%) indicated that this had occurred and that it had happened across diverse service areas, the most prominent being education (22%), health (18%) and lands (18%). Other areas mentioned were: police (7%) and traffic inspectors (4%), courts (7%), elections (5%), licensing authorities (3%) and tendering boards (1%). Provincially, the minor corruption participation figures were somewhat higher in NCD and Morobe (both 52 %) and lower in ENB (32%).



Are these children victims of corruption? National delivery of education services should mean this level of service delivery should not occur. http://apbca.com/galleries/png/pngd0325-2/

Similarly as for entitled services, 41% of survey respondents admitted participating in minor acts of corruption to get a service that they were not entitled to. They indicated that this had occurred across diverse service areas, most common being: police (39%), education (16%), traffic inspectors (11%) and courts (11%). Other areas cited are: health (9%), elections (3%), licensing authorities (2%), lands (4%) and tendering boards (1%). We assume that the prominence of the police here, is where respondents paid for impunity (avoidance of legal process and consequences.) Again, NCD figures for admitted participation were higher (52%) and ENB figures were notably lower (24%).

As shown in Figure 14 below, bribery was the main type of corrupt action used gain benefit that they were not entitled to. A possible explanation for why women feature more prominently than men in bribery is that women may be acting under duress with health and education providers.




Figure 14: Type of corruptions committed by survey respondents who have participated in minor acts of corruption (n=519)

When asked about the frequency of participation in all of these minor corrupt acts, 55% declare no participation, 11 % report 8 times per year or more, 33% report two or three times or less. This is a much lower frequency than reported elsewhere.

When asked whether someone close to them or they themselves have participated¹¹ in major acts of corruption, nearly one half (47%) of all survey respondents, (53% males and 41% females) replied affirmatively, as shown in Figure 15 below.




Figure 15: A cross analysis of level of participation in major acts of corruption by respondent or someone known to respondent by gender (N=1280)

¹¹ Therefore these similar rates could be driven by two different people, the respondent or someone close to them, which could mean the individual rate could be much lower. On reflection, given peoples openness the question could have been more targeted.

Completely contrary to admitted minor corruption participation, NCD and Central were lower (34%) in admitted participation in major corruption, with the outside provinces higher (EHP 59%, ENB 54% and Morobe 53%). This may suggest that with more serious corruption there is less chance of getting caught away from the capital.

The only other notable demographic feature relating to participation of respondent or someone known to the respondent in major acts of corruption is the level of household income. As illustrated in Table 18 below, higher income earners (57%) as compared to lower income earners (44%) reported to have either personally participated in major acts of corruption or knew someone who had done so. (This raises the question as to the extent to which incomes are higher because of participation in corrupt actions.)

Table 18: A cross analysis of participation in major acts of corruption by respondent or someone known to respondent by total household income in a fortnight


Participation in major acts of	Total	Total Total Household Income in a fortnight					
corruption by respondent or someone known to respondent		Less than 100 Kina	100 - 500 Kina	500 - 1000 Kina	1000 - 2000 Kina	2000 Kina Plus	DK
Yes	47%	44%	45%	50%	52%	57%	31%
No	53%	56%	55%	50%	48%	43%	69%
Number of respondents	1280	281	468	305	124	51	51

As depicted in Figure 16 below, survey respondents who reported to have personally participated or know someone who has participated in major acts of corruption indicated that this mainly involved bribery (57%) and impunity (23%) and occurred across diverse service sectors, the most prominent of which were: lands (20%), courts (15%), education (14%) and elections (13%). Other service areas mentioned include: the police (10%), health (8%), traffic inspectors (2%), licensing authorities (2%) and tendering boards (2%). This did not vary by gender but did by province. NCD had the lowest level of misappropriation at 14% whereas Morobe had more than double that. Central had the highest rate of bribery whereas Morobe had the least. This may be explained by theft of assets being harder to get away with in the capital, where because of higher incomes bribery is more affordable and harder to detect.



Polling Officer filling out multiple ballots, Western Highlands 2012

Figure 16: Types of major acts of corruption committed by respondents or persons they know by province (n=519)



When Free Education Isn't Free: Creeping Corruption in PNG Education

A friend of ours since the late '90s, Kenny is a peanut seller at the local Goroka market. He, his wife Sera, and their two children moved from a remote part of Okapa district to Goroka a few years ago. Their reason for moving was to ensure their children would be able to go to a school that could be relied upon to be open for most of the school year. A few days ago he visited our home to recharge his solar pack from our mains power after three days of grey skies. Over a cup of tea we caught up on family news and the latest travails in supporting his children to go to school.

Kenny and Sera have a niece whose father left the family, leaving her, her siblings and her mother in a precarious financial position. No longer able to afford the "project fees" of the school she had been attending in one part of Okapa district ("A good school – the teachers are usually there"), she had been attending another school ("It's up and down. Sometimes open and sometimes not"). On a recent visit Kenny and Sera could see the worry in their niece's eyes, and then heard from others that she had been secretly calling her father, who now lives in Moresby, pleading with him to help pay for her education. So far he hasn't. Kenny and Sera felt very sorry for their niece, so they spoke with their two children and asked if they would mind if the niece came to live with them in their small bush-materials house. Their children agreed that this would be the right thing to do. Since last week Kenny and Sera have started supporting their niece and their own children to attend Goroka schools. Each afternoon the three children return from school and do chores (laundry, food gardening, fetching water, cooking), then eat dinner, and before bed they study and do their homework by the light of a solar lamp.

What, then, is now involved in getting a child enrolled in the government schools that Kenny and Sera's children attend? Now, it requires bribes. K100 to get Kenny's niece accepted before her transfer letter, which may take some time, has been received. K15 or K20 quietly paid to the person processing the paperwork for re-enrolling each child. Then "project fees", paid in cash. The government has restated its policy of no school fees and no project fees – but this is not the reality for the schools that Kenny's children attend, nor apparently for many other government schools in Goroka. In Goroka, and indeed more widely through Eastern Highlands Province, it is widely reported by parents that if you don't pay "project fees", the chances are that your child's enrolment won't be processed.

For rural schools in the Eastern Highlands, a big task at the start of each year is to get teachers. This has been the case since at least the late '90s, when my partner and I were first working on projects specifically on establishing and supporting elementary schools. Again, for the past couple of weeks, the streets of Goroka have been full of school representatives searching for willing teachers, and teachers who are (in Kenny's words) "marketing themselves". This means they are on the streets and in marketplaces awaiting offers from needy schools. Generally, if teachers have an urban posting they will take up that posting. If they have a rural posting, despite their official posting, some of them are open to better offers in other locations. In some of the remote places I am familiar with, school boards of management send delegates to Goroka to persuade, pay, and accompany teachers back to their schools. Payments are in the order of K3,000. To make these payments the schools must either "misuse" any Tuition Fee Free funding (TFF) they have managed to save from the previous financial year, or rely on the illegal collection of project fees.

In an environment where public servants may not be paid, or at least not paid when they should be (as happened in late February); where (in my own and my colleagues' experience over the past few years working in education in the Eastern Highlands) the government TFF payments to schools come late and allegedly not in full; where teacher postings are finalised after the school year has begun (postings were available for Obura Wonenara district elementary teachers two weeks into the school year); where postings have then been potentially invalidated following politicised changes of senior administration positions; and where teachers must make their own way to the schools they have been posted to, then corruption finds fertile ground. It is not reasonable to expect parents not to pay bribes if that is the only way to get their child into school. It is not reasonable to expect schools not to charge project fees if that is the only way to start the school year without having yet received TFF funds, or to ensure some teachers actually come to the school at all.

Kenny asked me some questions too: "In Australia, how do you make sure your daughters' school has teachers? What happens in Australia when the teachers don't turn up? Do you have to pay something extra for your children to enrol or to get their results?" Even though the laws and processes that govern all this are similar, in Australia I can take for granted that it works, and I have recourse if it doesn't. Kenny and Sera, and all the other parents in PNG, also deserve to be able to take for granted that their children's access to education is guaranteed.

By Rebecca Robinson on March 29, 2016

 $Rebecca\ Robinson\ is\ the\ Integrated\ Community\ Development\ Program\ (ICDP)\ Manager\ for\ CARE\ International\ in\ PNG.$ $Accessed\ from: \ \underline{http://devpolicy.org/free-education-isnt-free-creeping-corruption-png-education-20160329/$

2.8 Perceived impacts of corruption

We asked two questions about the consequence of corruption, the first about shorter term consequences and the second about longer term consequences. (Note that for this and the next question respondents could give multiple responses.)

As illustrated in Figure 17 below, a higher proportion (37%) of surveyed respondents who had witnessed corruption believe that some people got worse services or no service at all as a consequence of the corrupt act (especially in Central). This is probably because bribes given for practical or efficiency-related reasons (such as accessing timely and reliable services for the bribe payer) work to the detriment of other service recipients who have to wait for longer periods or even forego a much needed service. Other key perceived consequences include: abuse of human rights; loss of government money; lack of punishment of wrongdoers; and reduced level of respect for the law. This varied by province. Interestingly a much higher percentage of respondents in East New Britain were concerned about a loss of government revenue and human rights abuses. Eastern Highlanders were also very concerned about human rights abuses resulting from corruption, but in Central Province this seemed much less of a concern. However, all of these are interrelated consequences.




Figure 17: Perceived impacts of corruption in PNG (n=1137)



Perhaps the most worrying impact of corruption is on human rights and rule of law. Witch burning in Mt. Hagen 2014. Retrieved from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/inquirer/ladies-dispense-tough-justice/story-e6frg6z6-1226671595465

The responses to the question on the longer term consequences of corruption, shown in Figure 18 below demonstrates that a high proportion of respondents (40%) believe that it will lead to less respect for the laws of the land while 29% believe that it will ultimately lead to poor services (mainly less services or less maintenance of existing services), economy related consequences such as inflation and high prices (3%), unfair distribution of resources (1%), less jobs (1%) and less investment due to high cost of doing business (1%).

This again varied by province. People in ENB were twice as concerned by less respect for law than other provinces. People in Central were more worried about less development occurring. People in EHP were more concerned about the effect on employment as compared with other provinces.




Figure 18: Perceived long term consequences of corruption if corruption is not dealt with (N=1280)

In PNG, while corruption seemingly cuts across all sectors (even including religion), it is mainly associated with public officials. The responses are generally fairly consistent across provinces, but NCD particularly frowns on national public service officials (71%), probably due to proximity, and EHP on their Provincial and LLG officials (70%), which may be due to the conflict that has occurred recently in that provincial administration.



Collapsed bridge in Kainantu. 2014. What happened to the maintenance funds? http://www.thepostsinpng.com/2014/08/photo-journal-bridge-collapse/

2.9 Causative Factors

When asked who they think causes most of the corruption in PNG, multiple answers were accepted. An overwhelming (81%) of survey respondents cited members of parliament as key cause, while over half cited the prime minister and other ministers (53%), and provincial and local government officers (52%), while national public service officials were cited by nearly half (46%). This is shown in Figure 19 below. This did not vary much by province but perhaps not surprisingly people in NCD were more concerned about national officials than other provinces and in EHP they were more concerned about local officials than other provinces were. Again, people are not targeting certain ethnicities, either local or foreign as the cause. Nor did they see 'wontokism' or culture as significant causes.




Figure 19: Persons or institutions responsible for most corruption in PNG as perceived by survey respondents (N=1280)

Interestingly, when asked which three government sectors in PNG have the worst levels of corruption, see Figure 20 below the police was ranked highest (i.e. worst) with 75% of respondents naming it as being in the top three, followed in descending order by: elections (49%), education (36%), courts (29%), lands (25%), traffic (22%), health (19%), licensing authorities (11%) and tendering boards (11%).

Further, as earlier demonstrated, respondents had perceived members of parliament (81%) and various national, provincial and local government officials (46% to 53%) as the key causal agents of corruption in PNG. Clearly, the PNG citizenry is faced with a conundrum as far as reporting cases of corruption are concerned.




Figure 20: Government sectors perceived to have the worst levels of corruption (N=1280)

2.10 Motivation by Others for Participation in Corrupt Actions

When asked why people are involved in corrupt acts the chief reasons cited were inadequate income for public service providers or officials (39%) and the lack of accountability of the PNG government to the PNG population (21%). As shown in Table 19 below, other key factors in the perpetuation of corruption include: political interference by leaders (20%); people faced by lack of choice (20%); perception of involvement of everyone in corruption (18%); lack of integrity in the justice system (15%); lack of awareness by PNG citizens of their rights to accessibility of services (14%); much bigger government hence inability to monitor corruption (13%); low moral standards in government (11%) and low moral standards amongst the PNG population (6%); public service corruption from officials getting back their investment after buying their positions/jobs (6%); and foreign influences such as films and music (5%).

This varied very little by province but interestingly people in ENB gave much more significance to low incomes whereas in ENB were more concerned about people's awareness of rights and political interference.

Causes of corruption	Level of agreement
People don't have enough money and can't meet basic needs (school, medical care, etc.) so they ask for bribes	39%
It's easy to get away with it. Lack of law enforcement/punishment	21%
Political interference in processes by leaders	20%
People have no choice, and they are not strong enough to demand free services	20%
Everyone else is doing it, so people/businesses will lose out if they don't do it	18%
Lack of integrity in justice system	15%
People are not aware they don't have to pay extra to get services	14%
With big government today, people can't watch what the leaders do, like they used to in villages	13%
Other	11%
Low moral standards in government	11%
Low moral standards in population	6%
Public officials buy jobs and have to get their 'investment' back	6%
Foreign influences such as films and music	5%

Table 19: Causes of corruption in PNG

We were a little surprised by the focus on low income. While it is no doubt true that the compounding effect on costs of endemic corruption raise costs for all citizens, especially where services collapse and people have to go to private providers, we also suspect another reason. It could be that as we have focused on participation in corruption in the questioning, people are thinking about their own justifications and interactions which will principally be with minor or relatively minor officials, who might well be short of income.

2.11 Belief that change is possible

Asked if corruption in PNG can be fixed in their lifetime, only 21% of all survey respondents provided a definite affirmation as shown in Figure 21 below while a further 49% said yes probably. On the other hand 30% indicated that they do not believe corruption can be

What About Rural versus Urban??

You might expect that the views and experiences of people living in rural areas, in the thousands of villages of Papua New Guinea would be very different to that of urban dwellers. In total, 646 respondents out of 1280 came from rural areas.

Although their views and experiences did vary there was much less than we expected. In most cases it was only a matter of one or two percent.

People in rural areas reported experiencing slightly less corruption directly and were slightly more likely to refuse to be involved. However, many would argue that people in rural locations pay the heaviest price for corruption in that that is where the services are most degraded.

They spent slightly less on bribes and when it came to who to blame for corruption they were a bit more likely to blame church leaders than the urban dwellers and slightly less likely to blame the prime minister and ministers.

fixed. This lack of belief shows the extent to which the citizenry perceives corruption in PNG and its public service sectors to be deeply embedded in nature.




Figure 21: Level of belief that corruption will be fixed in PNG (N=1280)

The responses did not vary significantly by gender. In ENB and EHP people were more pessimistic, believing that the corruption problem will probably not (37%) or definitely not (40%) be fixed in their lifetimes). Across all responses, analysis by level of education and household income reveals that citizens with lower income and lower level of education attainment were more pessimistic as far as the belief that corruption in PNG is fixable. Specifically, and as shown in Tables 20 and 21 below, 30% of survey respondents who had attained grade 1 to 3 or none at all indicated that they were definitely certain that corruption will not be fixed in PNG while 26% of respondents with low household income (less than 100 Kina) were of a similar position. This observation points to the hypothesis that the uneducated or lowly educated and those with low household income could feel particularly powerless and have resigned themselves to the belief that the fight against corruption in PNG is a lost cause.

Belief that	Total	Education Level							
corruption will be fixed in PNG		No schooling at all or grades 1 - 3	Grades 4 to grade 8	Grade 9 to 12	Technical or Vocational school	College	University		
Yes, definitely	21%	15%	19%	23%	20%	23%	25%		
Yes, probably	49%	37%	46%	53%	51%	52%	50%		
Probably not	13%	17%	16%	11%	9%	10%	14%		
Definitely not	17%	30%	19%	13%	19%	15%	11%		
Don't know	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%		
No. of respondents	1280	113	377	464	95	151	80		

Table 20: A cross analysis of belief that corruption will be fixed in PNG by level of education attainment

Table 21: A cross analysis of belief that corruption will be fixed in PNG by total household income per family

Belief that corruption will be	Total	Total Household Income in a fortnight					
fixed in PNG		Less than	100 -	500 - 1000	1000 -	2000 Kina	Don't
		100 Kina	500 Kina	Kina	2000 Kina	Plus	know
Yes, definitely	21%	21%	19%	23%	18%	22%	29%
Yes, probably	49%	39%	53%	49%	55%	45%	55%
Probably not	13%	13%	12%	12%	19%	16%	4%
Definitely not	17%	26%	15%	15%	8%	18%	12%
Don't know	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%
Number of respondents	1280	281	468	305	124	51	51

According to the survey 30% of respondents, believed that punishment of leaders who break laws is the main action that must be carried out to ensure that corruption is reduced or eliminated (30%).

Other key actions as recommended by respondents in Figure 22 below include: greater punishment for acts of corruption (19%); raising public awareness of what to do in cases of corruption (15%); encouraging people to go to church (12%); instituting transparency to allow for ease of monitoring government actions



TIPNG's Open Parliament Project funded by the EU is making the PNG Parliament much more accessible to citizens. See www.parliament.gov.pg

(10%); and pushing for change in attitudes so that corruption is condemned as unacceptable. This is observed in Figure 22 below.




Figure 22: perceived actions that must be carried out to stop or reduce corruption in PNG (N=1280)

We can see that the top three suggestions all have to do with applying the rule of law consistently, something that TIPNG also strongly believes in. There was little variance by province except that ENB respondents stressed punishing leaders whereas in NCD having greater punishments and more awareness was seen as key. We can also see that females favour punishment less than males, but have a much higher preference for pre-emptive actions such as encouraging church attendance and efforts to change attitudes.

2.12 Citizen Action

When actual participation or involvement in actions seeking to stop corruption was assessed, a large majority (66%) of survey respondents reported that they have never taken any actions against corruption. Although, as illustrated in Table 22 below, only 29% of all respondents have taken actions against corruption this is still impressive given the risks and possible failure rate. Another 12% indicated that the

actions were successful while 17% said that the actions were unsuccessful. However, as a percentage of the 29% of actions taken, this is a 41% success rate which is higher than we would have expected given the views about who causes corruption and why.

Action taken against corruption	Total	Sex			
		Males	Female		
Yes, and it was successful	12%	13%	11%		
Yes, but it was not successful	17%	19%	15%		
No, but I considered doing something	24%	28%	20% 29%		
No, but if I knew what to do, I would have done something	25%	22%			
No, I would not try	16%	15%	17%		
Don't know	5%	3%	7%		
Number of respondents	1280	640	640		

Table 22: A cross analysis of belief that action will be taken against corruption in PNG by gender of respondents

Figure 23 below shows the key actions taken against corruption which include reporting to the police (29%), reporting to an elected leader (26%), reporting to a government department (9%) and reporting to TIPNG/ALAC (1%). People in EHP seemed twice as likely to report to the police as other provinces. In ENB there was a higher tendency to report to elected leaders than in other provinces. What should be noted here is the very low level of complaints directed to TIPNG/ALAC and none being directed to the Ombudsman's office.




Figure 23: Where respondents reported corruption complaints to. (N=373)

An important point here is that despite the police being seen as complicit in corruption, (by 73% of respondents), clearly some police are fighting against corruption. This work needs to be acknowledged and supported.

2.13 Assessing government efforts in the fight against corruption

Assessment of the level of effectiveness of government's actions against corruption reveals high levels of reservation and therefore dissatisfaction amongst PNG citizens. Survey data shows that across all provinces, 80% believe the government's actions against corruption are ineffective (59% find them

largely ineffective and another 21% say they are very ineffective). Only 17% of survey respondents indicated that the government actions against corruption are either effective or very effective, as shown in Figure 24 below.




Figure 24: Perceived levels of effectiveness of government's actions against corruption (N=1280)

The perceived high level of ineffectiveness of government actions against corruption in PNG is mainly attributed to political interference (48%) and therefore a lack of political willingness to combat corruption; this figure is even higher in NCD (62%). As illustrated in Figure 25 below, other perceived reasons for lack of effectiveness of the government's actions against corruption are: lack of funding (14%), inadequate powers to combat corruption (13%), allegiance exhibited by government staff towards their seniors or those who appointed them into their positions (12%), lack of motivation of government staff (7%) and public officials' fear of acting against corruption (5%).




Figure 25: Reasons for lack of effectiveness of government's actions against corruption (n=1032)

TIPNG's view that there is too much political interference, is then strongly backed by the general public.

When asked how satisfied they were with the government's handling of the Task Force Sweep (TFS) inquiry, only 39% indicated some level of satisfaction. 12% said that they were very satisfied while 27% stated that they were satisfied. This satisfaction was lower in NCD and Central than elsewhere. However, the majority of respondents (61%) expressed dissatisfaction (dissatisfied 33% and highly dissatisfied (12%) or were unsure of their views on TFS (16%). This is shown in Figure 26 below.




Figure 26: Level of satisfaction with the government's handling of Task Force Sweep (TFS) (N=1280)

When asked about the sincerity of the government's efforts to combat corruption, only 7% of respondents believed that the government's fight against corruption is genuine and void of any political motivations. In contrast 42% of respondents believe that the government's fight against corruption is political with no genuine motivation. Further, 35% of respondents indicated that the government's fight against corruption is driven by mainly political motivations but with some genuine motivations. This is illustrated in Figure 27 below.





Figure 27: The level of belief that the government's fight against corruption is genuine (N=1280)

Given data like this, it is hardly surprising that fraud is so common in the elections, as was found in the TIPNG 2012 election observation report. In a free and fair election no government could survive this level of public cynicism about an integrity issue as serious as entrenched and widespread corruption.

Survey results show that 44% of respondents have a positive degree of confidence in the proposed Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) with regards to its ability to reduce corruption (31% confidence and 13% great confidence). But as shown in Figure 28 below, approximately one in four (24%) respondents indicated that they have no confidence at all in the proposed commission. Nevertheless, the confidence in a proposed ICAC to combat corruption is far higher than confidence in the Government's

current efforts and will only be maintained if the ICAC proves to be independent and punishes wrong doers at the highest levels.

Figure 28: Level of confidence in the proposed Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) with regards to its ability to reduce corruption (N=1280)



2.14 Role of Religious Leaders

Survey respondents view religious institutions and ethical leaders more favourably as compared to government institutions in regards to fighting corruption.

However, when asked the extent to which they believe that churches and other ethical leaders are taking a firm or weak stand against corruption, a majority of respondents (55%) indicated that they have taken a firm stand; 13% are happy with the firm stand taken and 42% believe that while taking a firm stand, there is need for more firmness in combating corruption.



While church leaders may not be living up to parishioner expectations, some individuals such as these nuns in Mendi joined TIPNG's domestic election observation in 2012.

On the other hand, 45% of respondents believe that the churches and ethical leaders have taken a weak stand in the fight against corruption (or are unsure). Overall, 76% say that whatever their current stand, the churches and ethical leaders should be taking a firmer stance, as shown in Figure 29 below.

Clearly then, the excuse that some religious leaders give that matters such as corruption should not be discussed in a religious setting is completely rejected by their parishioners. ¹² This is especially important given that a significant number of citizens think that a key way corruption can be combatted is through the church.

41

¹² We did not collect data about church affiliation so have no wat of knowing if these results are specific to certain churches. However, a look at TIPNG membership that this view is held across churches.




Figure 29: Extent of belief that churches and ethical leaders have taken a firm stand against corruption (N=1280)

2.15 Role of PNG citizens in the fight against corruption

The survey respondents largely believe that the PNG citizenry is not doing enough to fight corruption. Specifically, 70% of respondents were categorical that citizens are not doing enough to fight corruption, a position equally assumed by either sex. That figure was even higher (80%) in NCD and Central. Only 29% of respondents felt that citizens are doing enough in this regard, as observed in Figure 30 below.




Figure 30: Perception on whether PNG citizens are doing enough to fight corruption (N=1280

When asked if they themselves are personally doing enough to fight corruption, the survey results mirror the above findings on PNG citizenry's efforts towards fighting corruption. Again 71% of respondents (of both genders equally) expressed the view that they are personally not doing enough to fight corruption (and again the figure was 80% in NCD), while only 28% of the respondents felt that they are individually doing enough in this regard, as shown in Figure 31 below.



A key action people can do to combat corruption is to vote for good leaders and to ensure that the electoral process has integrity as these people were planning to do near Malalaua 2012 using the TIPNG Community Advocacy for Election Integrity Guide.




Figure 31: Perception on whether survey respondents are personally doing enough to fight corruption (N=1280)

According to the survey data, citizens do not take action against corruption¹³ due to six key reasons, the most prominent being that they personally benefit from corrupt acts (28% overall but 39% in NCD and 33% in Morobe). The others in ranking order were: they are scared that they will be punished for whistleblowing (19%); they lack awareness of what action to take (17%); they just do not care (17%); they believe corrupt acts are acceptable behaviours (10%); and they believe that any action against corruption will come to nothing (8%). This is shown in Figure 32 below.




Figure 32: Perceived reasons why some citizens do not take action against corruption (N=1280)

For those who are complicit in corrupt acts a possible tactic to be considered by any government with a genuine interest in positive change is a combination of an amnesty for minor past misdeeds but threats of much higher levels of vigilance and punishment for any further occurrences.

 $^{^{13}}$ This was not specifically asking why they themselves did not take action against corruption.

For those who are scared of being punished, witness protection and implementing whistle blower legislation can help overcome this fear.

For those who don't know what to do, the use of new and old media and the implementation of effective civic education and complaints processes can mitigate this problem.

For those who don't care or believe corruption is acceptable, not just NGOs like TIPNG, but also churches have a very important role to play.

For those who believe nothing will happen as a result of complaining, both government and civil society need to better promote their successes and put more resources into ensuring they happen.

2.16 Awareness of TIPNG

TIPNG's core mandate is to create awareness on the damaging effects of corruption and empower people to make an active choice against it. It carries out its mandate by creating and working with broad coalitions representing civil society to prevent corruption by reforming systems. Survey results show that a large majority (78%) of survey respondents are not aware of TIPNG's activities¹⁴ in PNG. However, it may be that people do know of what TIPNG is and what it stands for, but not know of its activities. The later data which shows that 68% of citizens see TIPNG as effective or very effective suggests that this is true.

2.16.1 Awareness of TIPNG Activities and Functions

Particularly worrying is the lack of recognition of ALAC and OPP, and to a much lesser extent YDC, all of which have received considerable publicity. The other activities tend to be localised meaning that they only occurred in a specific location and so if respondents were not from there they would not be aware they occurred. Others such as SBCE are not yet rolled out. TIPNG's activities that generated awareness amongst surveyed respondents are WAC (15%), YACA (4%) and media statements and interviews (2%). The lower ranking of media statements and interviews could well be a result of the greater difficulty TIPNG has been having in recent years in getting the national newspapers to run its press releases. We suspect it is due to those press releases being highly critical of government at a time when government seems more sensitive to criticism¹⁵. This awareness of activities is shown in Table 23 below.

Activity	Total	Sex			
,		Male	Female		
WAC	15%	19%	11%		
YACA	4%	5%	3%		
ALAC	0%	0%	0%		
YDC	0%	0%	0%		
SBCE	0%	0%	0%		
REDD	0%	1%	0%		
OPP	0%	0%	0%		
Media statements/Interviews	2%	2%	2%		
Other	0%	0%	0%		
Don't know	78%	72%	84%		
Number of respondents	1280	640	640		

Table 23: A cross analysis of perceived activities of TIPNG by gender of respondents

As can be seen above, males are more aware of TIPNG's activities than females. Other than that, the main demographic variation is geographical; in NCD, 40% of respondents could name a TIPNG activity, and 31%

activities, which have been widespread and involved hundreds of people.

15 Although this is hard to prove, the way the press release was doctored by one newspaper shows that editors are working under pressure. The fact that blogs such as PNG Blogs carry so many articles critical of government that get no mention in the press is a further indication.

¹⁴ An unfortunate mistake in the questionnaire design was to omit exclude election observation, and voter education and SACL&N activities, which have been widespread and involved hundreds of people.

could do so in East New Britain. But in the other provinces (Morobe, Eastern Highlands and Central), 82-87% of respondents did not know of any TIPNG activities.

Of the respondents that are aware of some of TIPNG's activities (22%), only 53% correctly indicated that the type of work that TIPNG can do includes raising awareness on acts and consequences of corruption, and only 5% correctly indicated that TIPNG can push for changes in laws and policies to help reduce corruption.

However, among the respondents aware of TIPNG activities, a considerable proportion (41%) wrongly indicated that its mandate included carrying out investigations against corrupt actions (30%), prosecution¹⁶ of corrupt people (9%) and punishing of corrupt people (2%). For some unknown reason people in ENB and EHP were much more likely than elsewhere to wrongly believe that TIPNG's role is to prosecute. A cross analysis by gender and education level shows that a lack of awareness and knowledge on the role of TIPNG cuts across all levels of education attainment and gender as illustrated in Table 24 below.

Perceived role of TI in PNG	Total		Sex			Level of education						
		Male	Female	No schooling or grades 1 to grade 3	Grades 4 to grade 8	Grade 9 to 12	Technical or Vocational school	College	University			
Carry out investigations into corrupt actions	30%	23%	42%	11%	24%	29%	29%	35%	35%			
Prosecute corrupt people	9%	12%	5%	33%	14%	7%	9%	8%	7%			
Raise awareness on acts and consequences of corruption	53%	56%	49%	56%	50%	57%	56%	50%	52%			
Push for changes in laws and policies to help reduce corruption	5%	5%	4%	0%	10%	3%	3%	5%	4%			
Punish corrupt people	2%	3%	0%	0%	2%	3%	3%	2%	0%			
DK	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	2%			

Table 24: A cross analysis of perceived role/mandate of TI PNG by sex and level of education attainment of respondents

2.16.2 Awareness and readership of TIPNG Newsletter

178

281

Respondents who are aware of TIPNG activities, recorded reasonable awareness levels of the TIPNG Newsletter *Tok Aut* with 52% indicating that they were aware of it. A look at readership levels shows that only 9% of respondents who are aware of *Tok Aut* are 'active' readers (are aware of the availability of the newsletter and usually read it). A further 37% of respondents are more 'passive' readers of the TIPNG newsletter (they are aware of the newsletter but are only occasional readers of it).

While no clear demographic pattern was discernible among active readers of TokAut, 'passive' readers of the newsletter were largely male (43%) as compared to the females $(27\%)^{17}$. In addition, passive readers of TokAut were likely to have a higher level of education. As shown in Table 25 below, respondents who had



34

46

Number of respondents

 $^{^{16}}$ TIPNG is already changing tactics here with some funding being put aside for a fighting fund for prosecuting ALAC complaints.

 $^{^{\}rm 17}$ Possibly because of the lower literacy rates as reported by the PEAN study.

attained technical or vocational training, college and university education were more likely to read the newsletter as compared to respondents with lower education levels.

Ever read the TIPNG	Total	S	Sex	Level of education attainment								
Newsletter Tok Aut		Male	Female	No schooling or grades 1 to grade 3	Grades 4 to grade 8	Grade 9 to 12	Technical or Vocational school	College	University			
Yes, I look for it and I read it	9%	8%	11%	11%	5%	10%	6%	13%	9%			
Yes, I see it and sometimes I read it	37%	43%	27%	33%	31%	34%	38%	45%	37%			
I know it is there but I don't read it	5%	6%	5%	0%	7%	7%	3%	3%	7%			
No, I did not know it existed but I will look for it and read it	38%	33%	47%	11%	43%	36%	38%	35%	46%			
No, and I won't read it	2%	3%	0%	0%	5%	2%	0%	0%	2%			
Don't know	9%	8%	11%	44%	10%	11%	15%	3%	0%			
Number of respondents	281	178	103	9	42	90	34	60	46			

Table 25: A cross analysis of readership levels of TI PNG newsletter by sex and level of education

Regarding content of the TIPNG newsletter, both active and passive readers largely feel that it has a good balance between information on TIPNG and other items. Only 8% felt it has too much information on TIPNG activities while approximately one in four (24%) of its readers were of the opinion that it has too much information on corruption and governance. This is illustrated in Figure 33 below.




Figure 33: Perception of survey respondents on the content of the TIPNG Newsletter Tok Aut (n=131)



Kikori International Airport. Millions of Kina spent but nothing achieved.

2.16.3 Organizational Effectiveness

A look at the perception on the level of effectiveness of TIPNG with regard to fighting corruption shows that survey respondents are largely satisfied: over two-thirds (68%) of those who are aware of TIPNG indicated that it is doing its job of fighting corruption effectively or very effectively (12% indicated that TIPNG is very effective and 56% felt that TIPNG is effective). On the other hand, approximately 28% of the surveyed respondents perceive TIPNG as ineffective in its role of fighting corruption. This is observed in Figure 34 below.




Figure 34: Perception on the level of effectiveness of TIPNG in its role of fighting corruption (n=281)

To ensure that TIPNG improves in its role of fighting corruption, survey respondents who are aware of TIPNG and its activities offered key suggestions. As observed in Figure 35 below, a majority (56%) of survey respondents indicated that there is need for TIPNG to sensitize the PNG citizenry on its activities. Further, 28% suggested that there is need for more campaigns against corrupt acts while 12% indicated that TIPNG needs to increase its efforts on pushing for changes in laws and policies through preparation of laws and submitting the recommendations to parliament for consideration.¹⁸




Figure 35: Recommendations on how TIPNG could do better in its role of fighting corruption (n=281)

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¹⁸ Interestingly, very few if any respondents suggested that TIPNG should prosecute and punish and yet many thought that is what we do.

Chapter 3:

Survey Conclusions & Recommendations

3.1 **Conclusions**

- From the viewpoint of PNG citizens, corruption is associated with illegal or immoral actions as well as the abuse of entrusted power by public officials for private gain.
- Corruption is an enormous problem in PNG and cuts across all sectors.
- Corruption is a commonplace everyday affair in PNG and is a regular feature in the daily lives of citizens.
- Efficiency-related reasons and practical considerations drive corruption in PNG.
- The laws of the land, service provision and consequently the economy constitute the major areas that stand to suffer from corruption in PNG.
- A negative perception and disillusionment pervades the PNG citizenry as far as the fight against corruption by the government is concerned.
- Bribery is the main form of corruption in PNG and is linked to nearly all public sectors and for many has become a routine practise.
- Males are generally more likely to give bribes as compared to females, but this may reflect gender responsibilities (e.g. more transactional duties).
- Comparison of estimated per-capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with the declared worth of the bribes given by surveyed respondents in PNG shows that the level of corruption is more than modest.
- Saving oneself from spending large amounts of money in service transaction costs is a major driver for bribery, but fear of consequent loss or retribution if not complying also plays a part.
- The proposed Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) which will be mandated to reduce corruption has support among PNG citizens.
- Political interference and therefore a lack of political willingness to combat corruption is seen as contributing to the perceived low level of effectiveness of the government's current actions against corruption in PNG.
- The handling of the Task Force Sweep inquiry by the government was largely deemed as unsatisfactory.

Corruption Ruining PNG

Post Courier, March 29, 2016

CORRUPTION involving leaders and the people at all levels if not addressed will continue to cripple and destroy this beautiful country, says United Church Moderator Bernard Siai. In his Easter Message, Reverend Siai said corruption comes in different forms. It involves even little things like throwing rubbish on the streets and expecting someone to clean it up. He says after 41 years of Independence, as a Christian country PNG should be showing "fruits of maturity in our attitudes, behaviour, and our resolve to care for our community by respecting one another and living peaceably," but our lives do not reflect this. He says all around us, we see "broken families, disrespect for one another, stealing from our families, our Government, our Churches, private sector, and organizations. We engage in corruption of all sorts." "We have the tendency to develop irresponsible behaviour like selling our land to other people causing us to become landless on our own land. "We see in our communities, men not taking responsibility to grow, nurture and love their children, and we moan over rebellious children. "We allow exploitation of our natural resources in the name of economic development and advancement. Do we ever stop to think about the future of our children or even our own generation? We hear other people talk down on us as a people and a nation"....

- NG citizens believe corruption is embedded and permeates all sectors of PNG but there is some optimism that change is possible.
- A higher than expected percentages of citizens attempt to stop corrupt practices and a surprisingly high percentage, given the barriers, are successful.
- Prescribed solutions by PNG citizens to remedy the corruption situation in PNG mainly dwell on exemplary punishment of corrupt acts, sensitization on corruption including promotion of attitudes that shun corruption, and establishment or institutionalization of anti-corruption systems.
- There is little initiative by PNG citizens as far as taking actions against corruption is concerned.
- PNG citizens are cognizant of the fact that they are not doing enough to combat corruption.
- The perceived causal agents of corruption in PNG double up as the individuals or institutions that
 citizens would turn to in making corruption complaints; this is clearly a conundrum faced by PNG
 citizens as far as combating corruption is concerned and contributes to feelings of powerlessness
- Awareness of the activities and core mandates of TIPNG amongst PNG citizens is surprisingly low, especially outside NCD and ENB although the organization is regarded as effective suggesting awareness of its core function and existence is higher.
- There is a very low awareness of *Tok Aut* amongst PNG citizens and even lower readership levels of the newsletter

**** Prime Minister Hon. Peter O'Neill - K8 billion in trust funds gone missing between 2002 and 2010 ****

June 3, 2015

Prime Minister Hon. Peter O'Neill said more than K8 billion has gone missing in various trust fund accounts held by the previous government between 2002 and 2010. Prime Minister Hon. Peter O'Neill said these trust funds have being a huge waste and its whereabouts now is not known as not one single road, bridge, school or infrastructure was built by the government that time with these trust funds.

So where did it go and which institution was responsible for watching what happened? http://www.primeminister.gov.pg/#!-Prime-Minister-Hon-Peter-O%E2%80%99Neill-K8-billion-in-trust-funds-gone-missing-between-2002-and-2010-/csf/556e49f80cf2312d79679227



3.2 Recommendations

Recommendations for the Government of PNG

- 1. Take heart in the fact that despite the levels of corruption in the police, citizens have not given up. Encourage them to make complaints and champion those police officers that are doing their jobs.
- 2. Publically acknowledge the accuracy of the CPI and that the citizens of PNG are aware of what is happening and why, in terms of corruption and support more independent research like this.
- 3. Promote a government position that refutes the often stated view that corruption is a consequence of our culture(s).
- 4. Take greater actions to support school and community based civic education that can empower citizens to better understand and fight against corruption.
- 5. In these times when the economy is faltering clearly see the debilitating cost that corruption is to our economy and publically acknowledge and report it.
- 6. Take genuine and effective actions to curb corruption including: implementing freedom of information and whistle blower protection laws and making the Public Accounts Committee proceedings timely and public!
- 7. Consider strategies such as an amnesty for past petty corruption to get the information flowing.... But in the end those stealing from the state on a large scale will need to be stopped and punished.

Recommendations for International Donors and the Corporate Sector

- 1. Donors and corporates should absorb the key points of this report and build what can be learnt into their strategies for PNG.
- 2. Donors and corporates can greatly assist by repeatedly drawing attention to the findings when dealing with government.
- 3. While most researchers will recommend more research, in this case it is really needed. For PNG decision makers to be put under constant pressure there is a need to get regular feedback from citizens through surveys. This is partly because of the integrity issues with elections. This was not an expensive exercise in comparison with some research, and yet it is dealing with what is most certainly PNG's greatest problem.
- 4. The analysis needed for this type of research is complex and demanding and beyond the capacity of TIPNG's current staff. A logical answer would be to encourage the social research arms of universities in the region to assist. We believe that with some expert help there is much still to uncover from the current dataset and far more if it is refined and repeated in future years.
- 5. Given the enormous size of the problem, donors need to continue to engage with civil society on a long term basis so that TIPNG and its partners can continue to keep getting the message out and lobby for real change.
- 6. Crucial projects such as the School Based Civic Education project need a long term and substantial commitment to be effective. The help needed is not just financial. Projects like SBCE are highly complex and need to be implemented as part of a wider longer term cross donor strategy (with

support from government), partly because while civil society groups can play a crucial role in design, delivery and rollout will be beyond their expertise and capacity.

Recommendations for Transparency International PNG & its Partners

- 1. Use the findings to drive strategic planning and work planning.
- 2. Ensure all staff have read the report and that copies are available for members and Coalition partners.
- 3. Continue to further analyse this data and break it down into manageable chunks that can be used by the mass and social media.
- 4. Find funding and refine (some questions could be improved) and repeat this research annually.
- 5. Given that citizens have not given up and continue to make efforts to stop corruption assist them by developing tools such as social accountability apps to help them.
- 6. Make greater efforts to champion citizens who do take action against corruption. (The book of corruption fighting heroes is a good example.)
- 7. Make greater efforts to diversify the ways outreach is done to make it less literacy sensitive, through means such as SMS blasts, radio talkback etc.
- 8. Continue to find ways to fund and roll out critical programmes such as SBCE.
- 9. Continue to push for FOI and whistle blower legislation.
- 10. Continue to find funding support for ALAC to set up and maintain a legal fund for prosecutions of corrupt persons.
- 11. Work more closely with churches to carry TIPNG key messages (for example encourage them to start using and modifying the SBCE materials) and lift their game. (Codes of conduct and monitoring by parishioners could be considered.)



Photo: ARIS MESSINIS/Matternet. Medicin San Frontier vehicle on Kerama road. Accessed: http://www.msf.org/article/papua-new-guinea-innovating-reach-remote-tb-patients-and-improve-access-treatment

Annex I. CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2015 http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table

A country or territory's score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). A country's rank indicates its position relative to the other countries in the index.

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Levels & Consequences of Corruption in PNG and State & Society Response

This survey report on public opinion, conducted independently for TIPNG, shows that the levels of corruption in Papua New Guinea are very high and in alignment with the findings of the global Corruptions Perceptions Index.

The research shows that citizens are aware of the very damaging costs and consequences of corruption as they are often paying that cost directly in terms of often unavoidable payments and degraded services. Certain government sectors, especially those involved with key social service delivery and those whose task it is to combat corruption are seen to be heavily compromised by corruption.

Not surprisingly then, the government's efforts at tackling corruption are viewed very cynically by citizens although they are willing to give the proposed ICAC a chance.

What is heartening is that citizens have not given up, and see that corruption is a fixable problem despite its endemic nature.

This is a must read for any one with anything to do with PNG, and especially those working in policy development and implementation. The report is available freely for down load from our website.

99% think corruption is a serious problem

90% think it's getting worse

76% think the government is not genuine in its efforts to stamp out corruption



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